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ABSTRACT
The numbers and severity of global cyber security attacks on Indus-
trial Control Systems have increased over recent years. However,
there are also significant efforts to improve defensive capabilities.
While comprehensive reviews of risk assessment efforts exist, little
detail is currently available on how they are being applied by secu-
rity practitioners. This paper provides a summary of the approaches
adopted by security practitioners, outlining key phases applied to
risk assessment, application of existing predefined methodologies,
and challenges faced throughout the overall process.
KEYWORDS
Industrial Control Systems; ICS; SCADA; OT; Cyber Security; Risk
Assessment
1 INTRODUCTION
Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) are applied to the monitoring,
control, and automation of operational processes across a range of
sectors, some of which can be considered critical national infras-
tructure (CNI) [7]. Cyber attacks targeting ICSs have become more
prevalent and widely publicised, the latest of which being an attack
targeting the Ukrainian energy sector [8]. These can, however, be
seen as a catalyst towards the development of defensive actions.
One key stage required in the development of defensive capabil-
ity is an understanding of existing risk, which can be used to better
educate and promote discussions on appropriate mitigation strate-
gies. This in an area which has seen coverage from both academia
and industry, with a range of risk assessment approaches. However,
the application of these activities within the security practitioner
(SP) space has seen little coverage. This work presents the find-
ings from interviews conducted with SPs, all of whom are actively
engaged in the assessment of ICS risk.
2 RISK ASSESSMENT
Risk management is the strategic approach to understanding and
pre-emptively reducing the impact of risk realisation against a
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target under consideration. Typically encompassing four distinct
domains: risk framing, assessment, response, and monitoring [18].
Here we focus specifically on risk assessment. Designed to provide
an improved understanding of risk, which if realised, could impact
organisational objectives. In addition, risk assessments can been
used to evaluate existing controls and their adequacy [2].
While there are a number of established approaches to the as-
sessment of risk, particularly within the standards community [2],
it can be seen that their application to ICSs poses a challenge. There-
fore, the development of tailored ICS specific approaches have been
witnessed across both academic [3] and industry contexts [17]. Our
previous work summarised a handful of approaches within existing
industry standards and guidelines (S&G) [13], with the work of [20]
and [6] providing more comprehensive discussions. However, ex-
isting works have provided little to no discussion from real-world
SPs. More specially, how is the assessment of risk achieved, in-
cluding core phases, application of existing approaches, factors of
importance, and common challenges.
3 INTERVIEWS
The following questions can been see as core to our interviews. For
a more complete view of the applied interview protocol/guide see
Green et al. [16]. For a more complete view of the methodology
applied to data collection and analysis see Appendix A.
• Do you work for an ICS operator?
• Do you work for a Cyber Security consultancy firm?
• Do you conduct Cyber-Security risk assessments?
• What do you understand the term ICS to include?
• At a high level, what are the core phases you go through
when conducting an assessment?
• What are your design/implementation influences in the de-
scribed phases?
• Which of the defined phases is the most important, and
which proves the most challenging to accomplish and why?
• Please can you summarise the process you go through for
(Read back phase 1, then phase 2, etc.)?
• What do you think of currently available standards and
guidelines?
• Is there anything you would like to add?
4 RESULTS
The following subsections present an aggregated summary of salient
points raised across all interviews. As described in Appendix A,
this focuses more towards a discussion of captured data, as opposed
to a statistical summary. Relevant quotations are included where
possible to further highlight findings.
4.1 Phases of a Risk Assessment
Ten core phases were identified across all interviews, a summary of
which is provided here. As we have aggregated interview data, not
all SPs feature in each of the described phases, nor do they align
directly to points made within the discussion of each phase.
4.1.1 Scope/Understand the System. Described by some SPs as
two separate streams of activity, the processes applied to scoping
and understanding the system often overlapped, and ran in a cyclic
manner.
Basic scoping exercises were described as a starting point for
engagement with an organisation. The length and depth of scope
was mostly associated with constraints placed on time and financ-
ing, with sector context also playing a role. Although scope was
considered a point to which both parties must agree from the begin-
ning, this could be seen as a starting point with levels of flexibility
required. Understanding what it is the organisation is trying to
protect, what aspects of the systems are most critical, who is re-
sponsible for decision making around security, which operational
sites to sample, etc. all impact scope. Throughout an engagement
knowledge across these areas builds, further impacting scope. For
example, where an inventory is provided of devices and systems
in/out of scope, should critical relationship between devices across
these two groups be discovered, addition to in-scope could occur.
"Well, it’s how long is a piece of string, really...."
A number of resources were discussed across this phase, these
included access to relevant people, network diagrams, organisa-
tional structures, operational design documents, historian configu-
ration, asset inventories, purchase orders, operational/procedural
documents, network traffic, physical security parameters, safety
documentation, etc. While obtaining resources such as these was
described as an important process within the phase, often achieved
in an office based environment, its validation was almost always
described as a core requirement. Most validation was conduced
on-site (the operational facility in question). Exceptions to this in-
cluded the use of question sets related to network and physical
security, procedures, governance, staff training activities, etc. used
in both office/on-site exercises with workers across different areas
of the business.
"You are massively dependent on the system owner’s and the system
operator’s knowledge at that stage...."
In order to extract the information require, SPs relied heavily
on the knowledge and experience of system owners and operators.
In relation to more technical details, subject matter experts were
also called upon (e.g. PLC engineers, mechanical engineers, etc.).
When criticality and interdependency of systems was established,
the level of questioning was adjusted. If a system were considered
less critical, fewer questions, and therefore time, was consumed
in fully understanding it. This level of flexibility can be seen to
reduce the involvement of those responsible for system operation
and maintenance.
"You need to add that context to it...."
Across SPs, the level of understanding discussed varied. How-
ever, to summarise it can be considered as a broad picture of how
the system is architecture and operated, including a mix of techni-
cal operational process characteristics, integrated safety functions,
failure modes, etc.; technical details related to the network, includ-
ing the location of computational resource and function; existing
controls (physical, technical, procedural, etc.); processes for recov-
ery, including details of relevant backup procedures; and general
maturity with regards to cyber security, including any training ac-
tivity, policies, etc. and their prevalence/acknowledgement across
multiple business areas.
The use of spreadsheets and relational databases were discussed
as methods by which data could be recorded. In addition to these,
some SPs organisations had developed their own tools, these were
considered intellectual property (IPR) and not discussed in any
detail. Given the diversity of context, and variance in scope, some
SPs felt that standardising the approach to documentation was un-
realistic. Instead opting for a more ad-hoc approach, with previous
techniques adapted to fit the system under review.
4.1.2 Understand Risk Appetite. Those responsible for instigat-
ing an exploration into existing risk can provide some initial insight
into organisational risk appetite. However, engagement with the
wider business was discussed as a more useful exercise in under-
standing risk appetite. Used to gauge the level of detail required
within the assessment process, this phase was described as an aid
in scoping and contextualising risk.
"What the initial risk appetite levels were in terms of from a
corporate perspective and from a national perspective...."
Understanding risk appetite presented an interesting view, with
inclusion of human resource from technical, operational, and man-
agerial backgrounds, providing more holistic details, covering or-
ganisational processes and what constitutes risk. Furthermore, the
suggestion of providing a national perspectivewas proposed.Where
some ICSs form part of a countries CNI, obtaining this additional
viewpoint and feeding it back into the organisation, could be of
value where risk is not fully understood within a cyber context.
4.1.3 Cyber Security Community Engagement. Engagementwith
the cyber security community was considered within the risk as-
sessment process as a form of information gathering. Used to gain
a greater understanding of threat actors, developing capability (of-
fensive and defensive), and likelihood of the organisation under
review being targeted. Example sources included the UK’s national
cyber security centre (NCSC), Idaho National Labs, and general
media outlets with articles focused on cyber security.
4.1.4 Understand Threat Actors. Understanding who is likely to
target the organization under review, their capabilities, and motiva-
tion, was used as a method of contextualising risk. Example actors
discussed included nation states, organised crime, amateur hackers,
lobby groups/activists, and insiders. Difficulties around quantifica-
tion of risk posed by threat actor groups was acknowledged, yet
having a basic view of expertise, tools/techniques used, level of per-
sistence, etc. were all described as useful in understanding existing
risk posture in the current climate.
"As far as I am aware, there is no perfect accepted methodology for
this. I mean, I’ve created a few myself where you allocate numerical
scores for different aspects of capability and intention...."
The use of historical attack data was described as one approach
for obtaining a greater level of understanding, particular where
systems of a similar nature have been targeted in the past. Even
where direct parallels cannot be found, should certain tools and
techniques be attributed to a specific threat actor, expansion of
those towards the system under review can be used as an indicator
capability extension.
4.1.5 Understand Vulnerabilities and Impact. Described by some
SPs as two separate streams of activity, the collation of informa-
tion derived through understanding vulnerabilities and impact pre-
sented an overlap, hence their collation here. This phase considered
system attributes extended beyond conventional IT system, there-
fore the application of existing IT based methodologies can’t always
be easily adopted. In terms of a defined methodology, some SPs be-
lieved a concrete formalised approach was not available. However,
a systematic view of identifying vulnerabilities was applied, focus-
ing on equipment and the operational process as a two-stranded
approach.
"Slightly different from just a control system down to an enterprise
system, hence why you can’t always easily adopt the enterprise
methodologies...."
Discussion on relevant data to inform this phase was typically
split between technical and operational/procedural factors. The
output of which was captured through use of spreadsheets, custom
tools (IPR), databases, etc. These would be used to understand how
a defined impact could occur, building links between likelihood
of vulnerability leading to impact given the existence of current
security controls/practices.
"Sitting down and going through an awful lot of cups of tea with
the people who run the system and saying, what are the impacts if
this item or this part of the process were to go wrong and what are
the mitigations that are already in place...."
Data captured from a technical perspective covered several points.
Logical analysis of system components was conducted, for example,
should a valve be IP enabled, and can be remotely accessed with no
protection/authentication, a vulnerability is present. This can be
considered a theoretical exercise, however other SPs made use of
tools (NMap, Nessus, and bespoke IPR) to identify known vulner-
abilities. Factors related to device support frameworks (e.g. is the
vendor still releasing updates) were also discussed. Technical points
mostly related to what connections exist to and from a device, and
subsequently the likelihood of it being accessed by unauthorised
parties. Questioning/Reviewing logic code of certain devices (PLCs
and RTUs) presented a greater depth of review, however this was
not broadly adopted by all SPs.
"The essential but slightly tedious thing of just you go through the
elements of the system and look at whether each element is
vulnerable to what you believe is the significant threat to it...."
Data captured from an operational/procedural perspective also
covered several points. These discussions included understanding
how operational processes can exceed accepted parameters, and
what states they cannot fall into. This typically involves numerous
discussions with stakeholders across the operational environment.
As part of these discussions, taking note of electro-mechanical
mitigations was another important point, alongside physical access
restrictions (sign-in sheets, cameras, vetting, etc.). Understanding
supplier relationships presented an addition consideration for some
SPs, this included discussion on how/where PLC and RTU logic
code was handled and stored.
"An awful lot of attacks, let’s call them malicious attacks, at the
moment may not simply occur because the safety systems will
prevent that...."
In providing meaning around potential impact observed, en-
gagement with the broader business was sought. This was seen to
allow for a more comprehensive view with regards to impact on
overall business objectives. With the categorisation of impact typi-
cally aligned to simple high, medium, and low metrics, additional
confirmation of this kind was therefore seen as highly valuable. Fur-
thermore, where prioritisation of impact was conducted, additional
viewpoints can again prove highly valuable.
"We just did a simple three tiered model of high, medium, low and
what are the, essentially what are the impacts that you are not
willing to accept...."
4.1.6 Assess Maturity. The assessment of cyber security matu-
rity was discussed, however the level of detail provided was limited.
The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) was applied
as one option. The decision to assess maturing using this model
was described as a good way to depict security posture and impact.
It was noted that this approach does not go as far as understand-
ing engineering safeguards, but can be helpful when conveying
business risk, aiding in the understanding of maturity across the
organisation under review.
"C2M2 shows the posture and approach to security and the
technical assessment shows you what the impact of that is...."
4.1.7 Assess and Prioritise Risk. Assessment and prioritisation
of risk forms the core component of most methodologies discussed.
A number of approaches to this were described. Some of which ap-
plied pre-existing techniques from S&G, or internally developed ap-
proaches from the organisation under review, with others described
as more informal discussions based on professional judgement.
"The organisation will have their own health and safety risk
assessment matrix, which is likelihood against a consequence and
it’s health and safety, business loss, reputation loss, for example...."
Some described this phase as a blend of art and science, requiring
flexibility and a degree of imagination. Putting yourself in the
mind of an attacker, and thinking in a non-liner fashion provides
a foundation to this narrative. This can be further emphasised by
consideration of dependencies between system components, no
matter how subtle.
"It is a blend between art and science...."
The approaches adopted by most SPs was adapted on a client-
by-client basis. A one size fits all approach was considered to be
incompatible given the scope and complexity of systems across
varying sectors. Understanding where a client is currently, and
where they are looking to go, aids in selection and delivery of a
given approach.
"Every situation is different, you know, what may be absolutely
brilliant for Client A may be not really relevant so much to Client
B...."
A number of external resources were discussed in relation to the
allocation of risk level. Examples include risk matrices from the
likes of ISA 62443. Based on a selection of vulnerability and impact
data, Low, Medium, and High, risk categories could be defined. The
use of a scoring matrix from existing S&Gwas considered a positive
approach by some, allowing for a level of repeatability, and added
credibility to any provided output ("Not just pulled from thin air").
CVSS data could also be used to feed into vulnerability calculations.
Additional tools, such as compliance models, were also considered
useful, acting as a reminder to explore forgotten factors. Where
clients employed existing approaches to the quantification of risk,
with examples related to health and safety, reputational damage,
etc. their adoption within the process was conducted.
"I think it’s quite handy to have some of the compliance models
because it reminds you that you’ve got to, you know, look at certain
areas. But you need to keep an imaginative open mind...."
Some SPs felt providing clients with detail exceeding "Low,
Medium, and High", or "Green, Amber, and Red", was unnecessary
and unhelpful, further complicating the output of an assessment.
On occasion the use of "Very High or Very Low" could prove to be
a valuable addition.
"It would generally be simply low, medium and high.. if you try and
do any more than that, you always up using three numbers anyway,
you always end up feeling that it’s going to be low, medium, or
high...."
The use of spreadsheets across this phase was prevalent. Applied
not only to documenting relevant data, but also in feeding that data
into a form of matrix or metric. Some SPs considered this to allow
for a tick box process/exercise to be conducted. Others developed
custom tools/software packages, considered IPR. Fault tree analysis
was also briefly discussed by one SP as an option used on occasion
to aid in the understanding of risk and better inform the client.
"Normalise that information, use the base information we got
initially from our interview as to where the base level of risk
acceptance is, and then we use that to help develop what we feel will
be their actual risk exposure...."
Where risk is presented as the assessor understands it, return-
ing back to various stakeholders within the business to further
contextualise and priorities risk was required. Activities around
the normalization of data towards initial discussions on risk toler-
ance/appetite was considered useful in providing amoremeaningful
output. This was also described as useful in the identification of
additional procedures/processes which had not been accounted for
during earlier phases.
4.1.8 Penetration Test. Briefly discussed as part of the "cycle
back" phase, penetration tests were also considered as a phase in
their own right. Where information had been gleaned throughout
the process with regards to a systems susceptibility to attack, on
occasions a penetration test was conducted to provide additional
validation of risk prior to the consideration of appropriate mitiga-
tion.
4.1.9 Discuss Risk. The discussion of identified risk in parallel
to standard paper based reporting was raised as an important phase,
ensuring all points were understood by both parties. The identifi-
cation of relevant stakeholders within this phase was essential, as
they may not always be directly involved in associated activities.
Typically, stakeholders would be included from across the business,
coving a broad range of technical and managerial viewpoints. De-
pendent upon sector, regulators may also be involved. Inclusion of a
broader stakeholder base was seen as a positive step for the assessor,
on occasion providing additional detail with regards to business
direction (e.g. asset x will be decommissioned in six months).
"Sit down with the appropriate stakeholders, say, normally the
service owner and normally the risk owner. So then you’ve got
someone who is ultimately responsible for whatever that technology
is, whatever the outcome the business and/or organisation is trying
to drive from it...."
Due to the background of some clients, presentations and re-
ports provided for use during discussions were described as suit-
able/designed for management. Discussion of risk mitigation was
also provided, again using high-level terminology suitable for a
non-technical audience. These discussions could include the use
of S&G to emphasis use of certain security controls. Furthermore,
road-maps for future evolution could be provided here. The applica-
tion of bronze, silver, and gold levels was just one example of how
the aforementioned roadmap could be conveyed to a non-technical
audience (e.g. bronze = 4 controls, silver = 7 controls, and gold = 10
controls).
4.1.10 Cycle Back. Once the risk assessment process had been
completed, some SPs went back to the start and cycled through
for a second time. This was done at differing stages. For example,
some cycled back immediately to confirm all risk had been captured
and assessed accordingly, others once security controls had been
considered to measure hypothetical risk reduction, or post selection
and physical implementation of security controls.
"You need to do the refresh because, actually, by the time you’ve
taken those steps, or planned them, you may find that actually the
threat has slightly changed...."
This activity was considered import for a number of reasons.
Change in threat landscape was one such reason, with understand-
ing of capability and intent providing a constantly changing pic-
ture. Induction of risk was another, where security controls were
suggested or implemented post-assessment, their inclusion could
induce risk. Where the latter point was of greatest consideration,
use of vulnerability and penetration testing services were also con-
sidered.
4.2 Most Challenging
When considering which stages within the risk assessment process
present the greatest challenge to accomplish, understanding the
system was of highest prevalence, with scoping, understanding risk
appetite, and understanding threats also discussed.
Challenges related to understanding the system were largely
directed towards reliance on system operators and their engage-
ment within the assessment process. Where matching physical and
logical characteristics is discussed as a key task, it can be seen that
understanding individual aspects of an operational process, and
their importance within the bigger picture, is of great importance.
Across these points are sets of procedural requirements one must
take into consideration with regards to the systems ongoing opera-
tion and maintenance. To gain the level of detail required across
these, finding appropriate teams and individuals was considered a
significant challenge. One might be able to ascertain nine of the ten
pieces required to build a coherent picture, yet without appropriate
resource acquiring all ten becomes impossible. Furthermore, it was
noted that some individuals can prove hostile, viewing the assess-
ment as a threat to their way of working/trying to catch them out.
As most engineers are not focused on cyber security, it was noted
significant effort to extract relevant information and relay it back
to develop clarity of baseline understandings was required.
"It’s not a witch hunt...."
Additional challenges raised related to supplied resources. These
included IT related documentation, outdated diagrams, and con-
tinuing evolution of systems, all leading to a lack of one single
comprehensive resource (individual or document set) with any real
understanding/detail. These were in part attributed to the contin-
ued use of system integrators, and lack of clear hand-over processes.
It is for these reasons teams are sent into operational environments,
validating any details provided within off-site engagements. How-
ever, this process instigates further challenges an assessor must
overcome.
"A lack of real understanding of how the systems work..network
diagrams if they exist are often inaccurate. A lot of these systems
are built by systems integrators, so the knowledge of how they work
and so on, stays with the systems integrators...."
Challenges related to scoping can be predominantly described
as managing expectations. Assessments can be limited by time and
funding, therefore agreement in terms of output must be managed.
Input from the organisation under review in relation to where the
focus should be is critical, and often shifts throughout the process.
"The hardest thing to achieve was to really define what the focus of
interest was from a sensible, a practical point of view...."
Challenges raised in relation to understanding risk appetite, high-
lighted deficiencies in an organisation’s understanding of cyber
security and its link to operational assets. Points raised around risk
appetite included limited detail on criticality of operational assets,
and the impact of their failure to wider business operations. With-
out engagement from management, understanding wider business
impact is often limited. Therefore, obtaining a solid understand-
ing of acceptable risk, and subsequent conveyance of risk can be
arduous.
"You raise awareness of them understanding what the risks are in
their systems, because, you know, people are not born thinking
about security...."
Challenges raised in understanding relevant threats was lim-
ited. However, examples included the behaviour of malware, being
relatively straightforward to map with a given context, compared
to that of threat actors and their evolving capabilities. The use
of perimeters firewall logs was proposed as a solution, used to
give an indication of the techniques attackers deployed against the
organisation in question.
4.3 Most Important
When considering which stages within the risk assessment process
are of greatest importance, understanding the system and what to
protect was of highest prevalence, with dialogue, and understanding
risk appetite also discussed.
The importance of understanding the system and scope were
driven by a view that you are not working to assess a single com-
putational resource, e.g. PLC, RTU, etc., but what that resource is
responsible for, overall system nuances, and possible avenues for
failure. As ICSs are highly complex, one small element could enable
unauthorised access to primary operational processes. Assessing
risk posed to operational processes was considered the end goal,
therefore understanding what they are connected to, and in-turn
what that is connected to, is a fundamental requirement. This can be
summarised as an understanding of devices, processes, and impact
of failure. Furthermore, it was noted that operation and mainte-
nance staff are considered components of the system, in the same
way as a PLC or RTU. Subsequently, understanding their numbers
and perception of risk feeds into one’s ability to adequately assess
risk. Once a high-level understanding is achieved, a more abstract
view can be used to define a clear boundary of scope. Without this,
inclusion of unnecessary systems could occur, reducing time spent
in other areas. All of which requires continual dialogue, with client
expectations managed and scoping extended or retracted where
required.
"You are not protecting a piece of hardware, you are not protecting
the PLC, a PLC is £100, you are protecting a system that it is
controlling...."
When considering criticality of operational assets, and the impact
their failure has on the business, understating of risk appetite is
considered of high importance. This related not only to scoping
and requirements for understanding the system, but also towards
dissemination of findings. Therefore, risk appetite should be linked
with operational processes in parallel to broader business objectives.
4.4 Use of Standards and Guidelines
Opinions of existing S&G was mixed amongst SPs. Largely con-
sidered a positive starting point, taken as inspiration, and built on
to provide a more comprehensive tailored offering. The following
subsections provide a summary of discussions in relation to their
use.
4.4.1 Example Standards and Guidelines Discussed. While some
examples are not individual S&G within their own right, they re-
late to a standards body/scheme/catalogue/information source, dis-
cussed in more generic terms. "ISF", "ISO 23301", "C2M2", "NESA",
"NIST 800 Series", "10 Steps to Cyber Security", "IS2", and "ANSI"
were discussed once. "CESG Good Practice Guides", "NIST 800-53",
"HMG", and "SANS Top 20" were discussed twice. "IS1", "Cyber Es-
sentials", and "NERC"were discussed three times. "ISO 27001", "NIST
Frameworks", and "CPNI Guidance" were discussed four times. "ISO
27000 Series" was discussed five time. "ISA 62443" was discussed six
times. No approaches derived from academic works were discussed.
4.4.2 Opinion of Standards and Guidelines. Where existing S&G
were viewed in a positive light, highlighted attributes focused on
their clear well throughout logical approach to a problem. Their use
was mostly described as a good starting point for multiple sectors,
allowing for customisation based on variables seen to change across
organisations, include size, sector, maturity, and budget. Their de-
velopment over recent years was described as maturing, being more
open to diverse minds (individuals with expertise in multiple re-
lated areas). The variety of available S&G was also considered a
positive attribute by some, allowing for less mature organisation to
begin their journey into cyber security (e.g. CPNI guidelines), and
more mature organisations to continually re-evaluate and evolve
their existing posture (e.g. ISA 62433). The output of existing IT
focused assessments (ISO 27001, ISO 22301, etc.) was considered to
be a useful resource within a more ICS focused assessment.
"I also think that organisations will need to just pick sections of
62443 depending on the type of organisation that they are...."
Where existing S&G were viewed in a negative light, a vari-
ety of points were raised. The most common criticism related to
compliance against a standard failing to deliver a more secure envi-
ronment. Other criticisms referred to the prevalence of numerous
S&G, leaving end users confused on what to use and where, all
with varying scale and scope. This point extended to the feeling of
some S&G being too large and complex, attempting to cover too
many areas within a broad non-sector specific approach, resulting
in a less than ideal fit to specific sectors. Other more generic points
raised included too much of an IT focus, lack of clear direction on
how far one should go in assessing and mitigating risk, focus on an
idealised end state, and inadequacies in addressing CNI risk given
the resources of some threat actors (e.g. nation states). Committee
participants were also considered as questionable, for example ISA
62443’s use of the zones and conduits, derived through discussions
with committee members from "firewall companies", and how its
use lends itself towards the procurement of products which directly
benefit the committee. Due to the points discussed here, one SP
concluded "you can just tear them up and throw them away".
"I’m sure the Titanic was compliant with all the engineering and
flotation standards when it sailed from Belfast...."
In more general discussions, a handful of interesting points were
raised. Continuation beyond an initial assessment and subsequent
mitigation was heavily emphasised. Some system owners were de-
scribed as failing to understand a continuing evolution of threat
landscape, requiring regular validation of defensive strategy. Sug-
gestions around future development was also common, with some
believing governments should provide clear guidance on the line be-
tween organisation vs. government responsibility for cyber security,
concepts related to the collaboration of multiple bodies to create a
single standard given existing approaches can be mapped across
one another anyway. The use of ISA 62443 or NIST catalogues were
considered to be the best options going forwards.
"I think that one of them will start winning out, my feeling it will
either be you know some form of NIST or 62443...."
5 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
Across these interviews, ten key phases to a risk assessment were
identified. Forming part of one initial phase, "understanding the
system", was considered not only to be the most challenging to
accomplish, but also the most important. The use and opinion
of existing approaches defined in S&G was mixed. Where used,
S&G often provided an initial base, from which more customised
approaches are applied. ISA 62443 was the most prevalent across
all interviews, with six of the ten SPs referring to it as a known,
applicable standard.
Where we see "understanding the system" to be a key phase
within the overall assessment process, it also presents a challenge
to assessors. This is a salient point to which we experienced a
similar reaction during some of our previous work [3, 15]. Also,
we see from the broader literature that this phase receives little
attention from within the academic community [6]. Therefore, our
future work will seek to further develop prior concepts [13] in
an effort to address this gap. Through the use of interview data
discussed here, and Lancaster’s ICS testbed [12, 14, 22], a practical
approach will be developed and evaluated. Ensuring it can be used
to bolster concepts from ISA 62443 [17], we feel, is of importance
given the observed popularity.
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A METHODOLOGY
The following subsections outline our methodology, applied to the
capture and analysis of interview data.
A.1 Interviews
Ethnographic observation would be challenging and time consum-
ing, particular when considering the sensitive nature of ICSs, and
would likely fail to yield detailed perspectives of SPs. Interviewing
was therefore selected as an appropriate alternative [23], enabling
non organisation-specific discuss. The ability to explore meanings,
routines, etc. [25] all adds towards focusing, and confirmation of
meaning from both parties when required [5].
We opted for a semi-structured interviewing approach, often
seen as the most common form of qualitative research methods.
This provided adequate flexibility with a predefined core question
set, options to include improvised follow-up questions, and explore
meanings should they be required [1].
A.1.1 Sample. In selecting an appropriate sample, we aimed to
obtain an understanding from all relevant perspectives. To achieve
this, a dual approach to the targeting of SPs was applied. The first
category of SPs work for organisations who operate ICSs, i.e. in-
formation security officers. The second category of SPs provide
cyber security services to organisations who operate ICSs, i.e. cyber
security risk assessors.
Although ten interviews were conducted, it is noted a sample
size of eight is often sufficient [21]. This extension ensured all
relevant points were uncovered, adding to the sample until little
additional information was provided, and ensuring the data set was
large enough to make generalisations with confidence.
A.1.2 Validity. There exist sets of common threats to the valid-
ity of interview data [4]. To address these, attention was initially
focused on our sample. From this, interviewing techniques applied
to build rapport, trust, and openness were adopted. Questions were
drawn from initial understandings achieved through a review of
existing literature.
Emergence of interesting content upon completion of interviews
is common [24]. These were noted and added to the interview
protocol/guide as additional prompts, useful for future and poten-
tial re-interviews. This approach allowed the interview process to
evolve in a structured and managed way, while eliciting pertinent
information.
A.1.3 Reliability. Of primary concern to data reliability is in-
terviewer bias i.e. the ability to trust findings are not derived from
research instruments, or as a result of an interviewers quirks and
improvisations. In relation to this is the perspective of "insiders",
defined as interviewers who share similar cultural, ethnic, linguis-
tic, national and religious heritage [10], or where the interviewer
and interviewee are part of the same organisation. This can prove
highly valuable when seeking additional participates, understand-
ing organisational structures, etc. [1]. However, it can also impact
data reliability, with an increased probability of assumptions based
on personal perspective. Neutrality beyond the aforementioned
"insider" bias was also considered throughout the interview proto-
col/guide design process, and during each interview. Acknowledg-
ing personal background, age, class, etc. as a potential influence in
the direction and output of interviews. Positive attributes of our
past experiences were utilised in the interview protocol/guide, and
interview process, however to account for the possibility of nega-
tive attribute inclusion, this document and subsequent transcripts
were reviewed by the team.
A.1.4 Practical Technique (Telephone Interviewing). Telephone
interviewing was selected due to cost and time saving, compare
to an in-person approach. However, unique challenges do exist.
For example, fixed-response questions are recommended, as open-
ended questions are harder to manage in this setting [9]. While
this is acknowledged, open-ended responses were necessary to
achieve the required level of detail. Additional challenges based
on interviewee focus were noted and addressed in designing the
interview protocol/guide, e.g. reduction in technical depth.
A.2 Analysis
Template analysis was selected for its highly flexible approach
to the analysis of qualitative data [19]. Sitting between content
analysis [26], and grounded theory [11]. It has seen an increase in
popularity since the work of King, Cassell, and Symon [19].
Although harbouring fewer specified procedures, recommen-
dations for its use are proposed [19], these have been followed
within the analysis of our data. For example, through use of our
interview protocol/guide, an initial code set (data categorisation)
was constructed. This code set was hierarchical, limited to allow for
further granularity or abstraction if required. Too many pre-defined
codes may constrain/confuse analysis, too few may cause a lack of
direction. Upon a brief review of two transcripts, additional codes
were added. These codes were reviewed by a separate researcher
for validation.
Additional codes were added throughout the codification process.
Existing codes were deleted and re-scoped, and changes were made
to the hierarchical construct. Use of parallel coding was also applied,
useful in identifying key themes appearing across multiple areas of
discussion. These are all considered common practice [19].
In the interpretation of coded data, we started by reviewing all
codes present across the range of transcripts. This allowed for the
identification of code frequency, providing a view on commonality
of approached adopted by each SP. Where a particular code was
prevalent across a significant proportion of interviews, and was
missing from few, we sought to better understand the reasoning
behind this. As the "why" is not always considered [19], additional
reviews of codes captured within the few, along with a secondary
review of specific transcripts was conducted.
